Algorithmic hate: The political economy of the Far-Right online
Sara Hill - Doctoral Researcher, Department of Politics & International Relations, University of Sheffield
Examinations of online far-right activity often focus on harmful content proliferation and its social and political impact. However, understandings of its spread often lack a consideration of the emerging political economy of social media algorithms and surveillance capitalism.
When Brenton Tarrant opened fire on a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, murdering 51 people and injuring many more in 2019, headlines around the world began talking about ‘ecofascists’, a label Tarrant had claimed in his manifesto. When that attack was followed by two more in the next two years using the same label, ecofascism once again became a key conversation topic, prompting journalists and researchers to examine the traits of this ideology, its history and its proponents.
The historical development of ecofascism can be traced to Volkisch philosophy in late 1800s Germany, through Nazi ‘Blood and Soil’ narratives and into the modernity of far-right extremism, where it resides as a transnational, online network. Ecofascism embraces a romanticised, mystical imaginary wherein ethnonationalist standpoints are ‘justified’ through a naturalised connection with the land, meaning that only those ‘from that land’ can truly steward it. In this construction, immigrants become an environmental threat, although notably this belief is not transferred to white residents of settler colonial nations such as the United States. From this, and influenced by Great Replacement theory and a sprinkling of neo-Malthusian scarcity rhetoric, ecofascism inspires violent far-right anti-immigration sentiment under the cover of climate concern. There is much discourse around this and the far-right online and routes to radicalisation via social media. Indeed, when asked where his ecofascist views were developed, Tarrant replied “The Internet, of course.”
Research and debates around ecofascism, and the far-right more generally, tend to focus on the content and spread of these communities, documenting hate speech and examining the ideological development of these movements. However, often missing from the discussion is an examination of the economic dimension of this content; namely the monetisation and profitability of online content, irrespective of its nature. This goes beyond the well known method of revenue generation on social media, the adverts users inevitably try to skip, and into the labyrinthine mechanics of user profiling and generating vast quantities of behavioural data for use in revenue generation. Shoshana Zuboff’s ‘Age of Surveillance Capitalism’ is a key work in explicating these mechanics but has yet to be analysed in combination with the proliferation of the far-right online. Considering these together is vital in understanding how the political economy of the internet creates perverse incentives to promote problematic and dangerous content to social media users.
Zuboff contends that we find ourselves in a new form of capitalism, a variant of information capitalism which commodifies human experience, transforms it into behavioural data used for the creation of prediction products and traded on behavioural futures markets. It is an often quoted maxim that ‘if you are not the customer, you are the product’. This is usually understood to mean that in order to use, for example Facebook, for free, you are allowing them to sell advertising space targeted to your demographic information in order to make their business model work. In surveillance capitalism however, you are not the product, humanity is the mountain being strip-mined by international corporations with little care for the ecosystem (society) in which the mountain exists.
The algorithms charged with keeping our attention in order to generate behavioural surplus data are remarkably effective. Our online behaviour is collected in more than simply ‘likes’ and ‘shares’. It is analysed in minute detail, wherein a partial second of pause before scrolling on is recognised and acted upon. It is imperative in this system that the mountain remain accessible for mining, and accessible means online, so any advantage in keeping attention is taken irrespective of the nature of the content being paid this attention. When considering this method of revenue generation in the context of ecofascism we see where the supposed impartiality of the system creates its own issues. Attention paid to content could indicate agreement, it could be a pause of horror, but either is registered as a positive interaction and fuels the creation of more, similar content. This data is also used to suggest further content to each user with the aim of extending the time a user spends on the platform.
This creation of content funnels can have problematic unintended consequences, as evidenced by a recent study showing that interaction with transphobic content on TikTok leads a user down a funnel towards far-right violence with startling rapidity. In the ecofascist context, content related to climate change, which gains attention from across the political spectrum, can inadvertently expand the audience for ecofascist narratives by providing another funnel into extremism. A user who paused in shock at a racist video and also displays interest in the environment may find themselves swiftly in the realms of “Save trees not refugees” slogans. Crucially, whether our imaginary user agrees with this content or not does not detract from the extraction of data for monetisation in the form of Zuboff’s behavioural futures markets and targeted advertising. Therefore the economic imperative to create and promote extremist content remains and the more of this content is created the more potential it has to seep into culture – akin to toxic runoff from the strip-mining on the mountain.
This is not to advance some fascist conspiracy theory of vast proportions, but simply to argue that in our increasingly complex and interconnected digital world, the factors which generate normatively problematic outcomes are more myriad than ever. With the levers of control in private hands and perverse incentives created by the profitability of behavioural prediction and manipulation, we have created a profitable data economy which reinforces a perfect storm of vulnerabilities open to exploitation. A storm which requires interdisciplinary collaboration to understand and counter. The intensification and proliferation of far-right narratives is a multi-faceted threat to social justice, action on climate change, and has implications for governments across the world which must be addressed as a matter of international urgency. At a time when governments around the world are considering their policies on technology and in the face of figures such as Elon Musk wading into policy debates, the need for deeper research into these shadow economies is starkly highlighted.
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