SPERI spotlight on the UN climate summit I

The long-awaited Paris climate summit is almost upon us. Much remains to be decided at this latest Conference of the Parties, or COP21, as the meeting is known in climate politics jargon, including financial support and compensation for vulnerable countries, emissions reporting and verification systems, and the legal form and status of the agreement.

For most people, of course, the main game in town is the numbers game: will countries commit to significant emission reductions that will save current and future generations from the more extreme effects of global warming? We can expect thousands of citizens on the streets of Paris calling for greater ambition, but the truth is that this particular deal is already sealed. The numbers are on the table and they won’t be revised before December. We already know the total emission reductions promised: in fact, they are not even emission reductions, but rather limitations on emission growth. Based on current pledges, global emissions in 2025 will be 34-46% higher than in 1990, and 37-52% higher in 2030. This will limit global warming to about 2.7°C, higher than the official goal of 2°C, and much higher than the 1.5°C vulnerable countries call for. Pushing for more ambitious action is evidently essential, but we now need to set our sights beyond Paris. Expecting promises of more ambitious cuts this year is a recipe for disappointment.

The acronym soup of climate change negotiations can leave even the most seasoned observer bewildered. Acronyms become verbs, which then become adjectives, which then transform again into verbs (e.g. ‘Measuring, Reporting and Verifying’ gave us MRV, then MRVable, then Merv!). Such ‘language’ is clearly impenetrable to those outside the bubble that is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Nevertheless, one particular acronym innovation that ought to be understood is the shift from QELROS (quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives) to INDCs (intended nationally determined contributions).

In the early years of the international climate regime it was widely accepted that climate change mitigation should be pursued through international targets and timetables. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated by setting a global reduction target of 5% below 1990 levels by 2008-12. National targets were then negotiated to divide the responsibility for reaching this in a broadly equitable way. This ‘top-down’ approach has been replaced in recent years with a ‘bottom-up’ approach whereby states announce what they are willing to do: there is no common baseline year (e.g. 1990), no common timetable (e.g. 2025) and no common goal to be shared out (e.g. 50% global emission reduction). Rather than determine the global outcome we want, and then divvy up the responsibility to achieve it, we now accept an offering from each country and hope it adds up to something ambitious.

This bottom-up idea isn’t brand new. It is a watered down version of something first proposed in 1991. In the face of US resistance to targets and timetables, Japan suggested a ‘pledge and review’ system whereby states would unilaterally choose an aspirational target, which would be periodically reviewed by an international panel. Environmentalists were generally sceptical, dubbing it a strategy of ‘hedge and retreat’. The Europeans shared this scepticism and managed to talk down the idea when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated. But sometimes bad ideas have a way of popping back up in negotiations.